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Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 5 (2008) 1
CRIMINAL LAW – RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Summary
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for the sale (two counts) and giving away (one
count) of a controlled substance issued by the district court.
Disposition/Outcome
Reversed and remanded. Because the district court failed to conduct a sufficient Farreta
canvass, 2 and because the overall record did not evince a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of defendant’s right to counsel, this case must be remanded to the district court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Factual and Procedural History
Appellant Hooks was charged with three counts of sale of a controlled substance on
November 13, 2003. The State subsequently reduced one count of sale to one count of giving
away a controlled substance. A public defender was appointed to Hooks at his justice court
arraignment. However, at his preliminary hearing appellant requested to proceed without
counsel. Hooks asked for, and received, a Farreta canvas by the justice court judge. At the
conclusion, the appellant was allowed to proceed pro se. Still, the court appointed standby
counsel.
Later, in district court, Hooks reiterated his desire to proceed pro se. The judge, 3 warned
appellant of the risks inherent in representing oneself and asked questions aimed at determining
Hooks’s education and awareness of the severity of the charges he faced. The judge then
appointed appellant’s standby counsel to continue in that capacity. Standby counsel later moved
to withdraw, whereupon Hooks reiterated his desire to proceed pro se. In response, the judge
scheduled a Farreta canvass for April 12, 2004.
On April 12, 2004, the court appointed new standby counsel. Rather than go forward
with the Farreta canvass, the court granted appellant’s newly appointed standby counsel a
continuance. Consequently, the district court failed to ever conduct a Farreta canvass; not at any
subsequent hearing or at trial. A jury convicted Hooks on all counts. Further, the district court
deemed appellant a habitual criminal and sentenced him to three concurrent prison terms of life
with the possibility of parole after ten years.

1

By M. Charles Seaton
Farreta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
3
Stewart L. Bell, Eighth Judicial District Court Judge.
2

Discussion
In this appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court examined whether the appellants constitutional
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment was violated. The Court held that the district
court’s failure to conduct a Farreta canvass – combined with the record’s failure to indicate a
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of appellant’s right to counsel – required reversal of
his judgment of conviction.
The Court examined the scope of the Farreta canvass and the requirements for a valid
waiver of the right to counsel, acknowledging that a defendant cannot “knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily” waive the right to counsel unless he is fully apprised of the severe consequences
he may face by proceeding in the absence of counsel. 4 Further, the Court noted that whether a
waiver is valid will depend upon the circumstances of the case. 5 Also, the Court referenced its
own pronouncement on the issue, codified at SCR 253 in 1997, which directs courts to “make a
specific, penetrating and comprehensive inquiry” of the defendant to insure that he fully
comprehends the risks of his decision to forego counsel. 6
The Court noted that although prior precedent disavowed any absolute requirement for a
“mechanical” Farreta canvass in every case, it also had counseled district courts to conduct a
searching inquiry whenever a defendant sought to proceed pro se. 7 The Court then took the
opportunity in this case to reemphasize the importance of such an inquiry, in part by noting one
favorable consequence; avoiding a new trial on the merits.
In this case, the Court concluded that the record – viewed as a whole – did not
demonstrate a valid waiver of appellant’s right to counsel. It found the justice court’s canvass
insufficient, on its own, to constitute a valid waiver of the right. Further, the Court noted that the
district court repeatedly failed, contrary to its earlier stated intention, to ever conduct an adequate
Farreta canvass.
The Court followed with an analysis of the district court proceeding, holding that Judge
Bell’s limited inquiries into appellant’s awareness of the difficulties and dangers awaiting him if
he continued pro se were insufficient to show a voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. The
Court seemed particularly concerned about Hooks’s apparent ignorance of his potential to face a
finding of habitual criminal status, and the severe consequences this would (and did) have on his
eventual sentence.
Finally, the Court noted the inapplicability of harmless-error analysis to waivers of the
right to counsel, and reversed and remanded Hooks’s judgment of conviction.
Conclusion
In reversing the appellant’s judgment of conviction, The Supreme Court of Nevada
reemphasized district courts’ duty to conduct a Farreta canvass and conduct a thorough inquiry
into whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
Here, the court found the record, as a whole, insufficient to demonstrate that Hooks waived his
right to counsel. Moreover, the Court cautioned that a justice court Farreta canvass will rarely
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be sufficient, in isolation, to constitute a valid waiver of the right, especially given the substantial
differences and dangers that await a defendant in district court.

